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Abstract
A5/1 is a shift register based stream cipher which pro-
vides privacy for the GSM system. In this paper, we
analyse the loading of the secret key and IV during
the initialisation process of A5/1. We demonstrate
the existence of weak key-IV pairs in the A5/1 ci-
pher due to this loading process; these weak key-IV
pairs may generate one, two or three registers con-
taining all-zero values, which may lead in turn to
weak keystream sequences. In the case where two
or three registers contain only zeros, we describe a
distinguisher which leads to a complete decryption of
the affected messages.
keywords: A5/1, initialisation process, loading
phase, weak key-IV pairs, ciphertext only attack,
stream cipher.
1 Introduction
The privacy of mobile telephone communications is
protected by the A5/1 stream cipher. The approxi-
mate design of A5/1 was leaked in 1994 and the ex-
act design revealed in 1999, when it was reverse en-
gineered by Briceno (Briceno et al. 1999). A5/1 is
a bit-based stream cipher that takes a 64-bit secret
key and a 22-bit initialisation vector (IV), the frame
number, as inputs into the 64-bit internal state. The
internal state of this cipher is contained in three linear
feedback shift registers (LFSRs).
Most recent stream cipher proposals require an ini-
tialisation process as an essential part of the cipher’s
specification. During the initialisation process, a se-
cret key, k, and an IV, v, are loaded into the internal
state. This loaded state is then processed to diffuse k
and v across the internal state before keystream gen-
eration occurs. A good initialisation process should
ensure that keystreams formed from the same key but
different IVs do not reveal information about the se-
cret key and can not be used to facilitate any attack.
It is sometimes possible to find key-IV pairs that
result in one or more registers containing only zeros
at the end of the loading and diffusion phases of the
initialisation process (Zhang & Wang 2009). We refer
to key-IV pairs that generate one or more registers
containing all-zeros at the end of the loading phase
as weak key-IV pairs.
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In A5/1, the key and IV are loaded by clocking the
registers and combining successive key and IV bits
with the usual register feedback; thus, the registers’
feedback mechanism is not autonomous during this
process. For some non-zero key-IV combinations, this
results in one or more of the registers containing only
zeroes at the end of the loading phase.
In this paper, we establish conditions under which
such weak key-IV pairs exist for the A5/1 cipher. We
show that if a weak key-IV pair results in two or three
of the registers containing all-zero values, then the
generated keystream is easy to distinguish and the
cipher is vulnerable to attack. Under these circum-
stances, a ciphertext-only attack can be used to reveal
the secret key and hence to decrypt the entire conver-
sation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a full description of the A5/1 stream cipher
including the non-autonomous feedback mechanism
during the loading phase of the initialisation process.
Section 3 provides a matrix representation for the
operation of an autonomous LFSR and adapts this
technique to a non-autonomous LFSR as used in the
loading phase of A5/1. This representation is used
in Section 4 to determine the conditions under which
one, two and three registers contain all-zero values.
Section 5 presents a possible ciphertext-only attack
procedure to reveal the secret key in the cases where
two or three registers contain only zeros. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Description of A5/1
A5/1 (Biryukov et al. 2001, Golic´ 1997) is a bit based
stream cipher which uses three binary LFSRs, de-
noted A, B and C, with lengths of 19, 22 and 23
bits respectively, giving a state size of 64 bits. Each
LFSR has a primitive feedback polynomial. Let S de-
note the internal state of A5/1 and let SA, SB and SC
denote the internal states for the component registers
A, B and C respectively. Let sia,t denote the contents
of stage i of register A at time t, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 18, sib,t
denote the contents of stage i of register B at time t,
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 21, sic,t denote the contents of stage i of
register C at time t, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 22 respectively.
A secret key of 64 bits is used for each conversation
and a 22-bit frame number is used as the IV for each
frame. Let ki denote the secret key for 0 ≤ i ≤ 63 and
vi denote the IV for 0 ≤ i ≤ 21. The three registers
are regularly clocked during loading of the key and IV
(frame number), while a majority clocking mechanism
is used for the diffusion phase and for keystream gen-
eration. The use of majority clocking implicitly intro-
duces nonlinearity to the keystream sequence. This
is the only nonlinear operation performed.
To implement the majority clocking scheme, each
register has a clocking tap: stages s8a,t, s
10
b,t and s
10
c,t.
The contents of these stages determine which regis-
ters will be clocked at the next iteration: those reg-
isters for which the clock control bits agree with the
majority value are clocked. For example, if s8a,t = 0,
s10b,t = 1 and s
10
c,t = 0, then the majority value is 0
and registers A and C are clocked. Thus, either two
or three registers are clocked at each step. Figure 1
shows a pictorial diagram of the A5/1 stream cipher.
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Figure 1: A5/1 Stream cipher.
2.1 Initialisation process
The initialisation process is conducted in two phases
as follows.
2.1.1 Loading phase
At the beginning, all stages of the three registers are
set to zero. Each LFSR is regularly clocked 64 times
as each key bit, ki, is XORed with the register feed-
back to form the new value of stage s0. Following this,
each register is regularly clocked 22 times as the IV
is loaded in the same manner (Biryukov et al. 2001).
At the end of the loading phase, the register contents
form the loaded state. Note that the state update
function during the loading phase is entirely linear.
That is, the contents of each stage in each register
comprise a linear combination of key and IV bits.
2.1.2 Diffusion phase
The diffusion phase involves performing 100 iterations
of the initialisation state update function using the
majority clocking scheme. During this phase, no out-
put is produced. At the end of diffusion phase the
cipher is in its initial state and is ready for keystream
generation.
2.2 Keystream Generation
Keystream generation comprises 228 iterations using
the same majority clocking rule used during the dif-
fusion phase. In each iteration, the keystream bit is
obtained by XORing the output bit of the three reg-
isters. That is, zt = s
18
a,t ⊕ s21b,t ⊕ s22c,t.
A conversation between two parties A and B is
sent as a series of frames, each of 4.6 milliseconds du-
ration. Each frame uses 228 bits of keystream: 114
bits to communicate from A to B and another 114 bits
to communicate from B to A. All frames within a con-
versation are encrypted using the same key, with the
frame number being used as the initialisation vector;
thus, successive frames use the same key and consec-
utive IVs for their encryption.
2.3 Origin of Weak Key-IV Pairs
During the loading phase, the LFSRs in A5/1 have a
non-autonomous feedback mechanism, since the value
of the new bit of each LFSR during this phase de-
pends on both the feedback bit and an external value
(either the key or IV bit). However, the LFSRs op-
erate or clock independently as the regular clocking
mechanism is used during this phase. Because of the
non-autonomous feedback, non-zero key-IV pairs may
result in an all-zero loaded state for one or more of
the registers.
During the diffusion phase and keystream genera-
tion process, the LFSRs of A5/1 have an autonomous
feedback mechanism, as there is no direct external in-
put to the LFSRs. However, the LFSRs operate de-
pendently during these processes, since each LFSR is
clocked using the majority clocking rule and depends
on the values of clocking bits of other LFSRs.
As noted, the non-autonomous feedback mecha-
nism during the loading phase implies that one or
more of the LFSRs may contain all-zeros at the end
of this phase, since a non-zero LFSR state is only
guaranteed if the LFSR uses autonomous feedback
from a non-zero starting point. On the other hand,
the autonomous feedback during the diffusion and
keystream generation processes guarantees that any
LFSR which contained all-zeros at the end of the
loading phase will remain in that state. (Although
the individual bits are clocked through the LFSR, the
feedback bit is always zero, so the register continues
to contain only zeros.)
At the end of the initialisation process, if two
or three LFSRs contain all-zero values, then the
keystream generated following this specific initialisa-
tion will be constant, consisting entirely of zeros or
entirely of ones. This flaw results in sending a mes-
sage as either clear text if the keystream is zeros, or
as the complement of the plaintext if the keystream
is all ones. Clearly this is not a desirable outcome.
In the case of one LFSR containing all-zero values,
the effective size of the state space is reduced but
the keystream appears to remain random (see Sec-
tion 4.3).
3 Analysis of the Loading Phase
As the operation of the LFSRs during the loading
phase is linear, it can easily be represented in terms
of matrix operations. An analysis of the matrices in-
volved then enables us to identify the conditions un-
der which a weak key-IV pair can occur.
The autonomous operation of each LFSR can be
described in terms of a matrix equation (Lidl &
Niederreiter 1997) as follows. Suppose that the stages
of the LFSR are denoted as s0, s1, . . . sd, the update
coefficients are c0, c1, . . . cd and that the update func-
tion can be represented as
s0t+1 = c0s
0
t ⊕ c1s1t ⊕ . . . cdsdt
sjt+1 = s
j−1
t 1 ≤ j ≤ d
Putting St = [s
0 s1 . . . sd]ᵀ, the LFSR update
(clocking) operation can be represented by the equiv-
alent matrix equation
St+1 = TSt where T =

c0 c1 . . . . . . cd−1 cd
1 0 . . . . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . . . . 1 0

is the state transition matrix of the LFSR.
During the loading of the key into the LFSR, the
LFSR state update function is given by
St+1 = TSt ⊕ σkt (1)
where σ = [1 0 . . . 0]ᵀ indicates that the new key bit
is XORed into the feedback of the LFSR. If we take
t = τ to indicate the LFSR state before loading com-
mences and iterate this process several times, from
t = τ to t = τ + l (where l denotes the key length),
we have
Sτ+1 = TSτ ⊕ σk0
Sτ+2 = T (TSτ ⊕ σk0)⊕ σk1 = T 2Sτ ⊕ Tσk0 ⊕ σk1
...
Sτ+l = T
lSτ ⊕ T l−1σk0 ⊕ T l−2σk1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Tσkl−2
⊕ σkl−1
= T lSτ ⊕NK
where N = [T l−1σ T l−2σ . . . Tσ σ] and K =
[k0 k1 . . . kl−2 kl−1]ᵀ.
The above analysis can be extended easily to cases
such as A5/1, which have three LFSRs, by denoting
the states of the three LFSRs as SA, SB and SC , their
state transition matrices as TA, TB and TC , their σ
matrices as σA, σB and σc and defining the state
transition matrix of the combined system in matrix
block form as
T =
 TA 0 00 TB 0
0 0 TC
 acting on [ SASB
SC
]
Likewise, denoting the σ and N matrices of each
LFSR as σA, σB , σC and NA, NB , NC , the combined
σ and N matrices for the whole system can be defined
as
σ =
 σAσB
σC
 and N =
 NANB
NC

With these modifications, the equation above, Sτ+l =
T lSτ ⊕ NK, is also valid for the combined system.
Noting that Sτ = [0 0 . . . 0]
ᵀ for the LFSRs of A5/1,
this equation reduces to Sτ = NK.
A similar analysis can also be undertaken for load-
ing the IV bits into the LFSRs. For a 64-bit key and
a 22-bit IV, we have
Sτ+64 = NK
Sτ+86 = T
22NK ⊕MV (2)
where M = [T 21σ T 20σ . . . Tσ σ] and V =
[v0 v1 . . . v20 v21]
ᵀ.
Now set τ = −86, so that S0 represents the
loaded state of the system, and consider the be-
haviour of the loading phase of A5/1. The terms
T 22NK and MV are XORed together. So, they
can be represented by concatenating T 22N and M
and multiplying by a new vector KV , where KV =
[k0 k1 . . . k62 k63 v0 v1 . . . v20 v21]
ᵀ as follows
S0 = [T
22N ||M ]KV (3)
We can apply Equation 2 to each LFSR of A5/1.
Let SA, TA, NA and MA represent the required ma-
trices for LFSR A. Similarly, matrices can be written
for LFSRs B and C as follows SB , TB , NB , MB and
SC , TC , NC , MC respectively. The new equations for
each LFSR can be written as follows:
SA,τ+86 = T
22
A NAK ⊕MAV
SB,τ+86 = T
22
B NBK ⊕MBV
SC,τ+86 = T
22
C NCK ⊕MCV
Now, we apply Equation 3 to each LFSR of A5/1,
the equations are as follows:
SA,0 = [T
22
A NA||MA]KV
SB,0 = [T
22
B NB ||MB ]KV
SC,0 = [T
22
C NC ||MC ]KV
4 Findings and Results
This analysis investigates the effect on the security of
the A5/1 cipher when the loading phase results in a
loaded state with one or more LFSRs containing all-
zero values. We call any of these states a weak loaded
state. As discussed in Section 2.3, if the contents of
any LFSR is all-zeros after the loading phase, it will
remain so for the whole of the diffusion and keystream
generation phases, since the LFSR has no external
input during these phases. Thus, the LFSR contents
will not be changed until the cipher is re-initialised to
encrypt the next frame in the conversation.
The total size of the secret key and IV for A5/1 is
64 + 22 = 86 bits, which exceeds the 64-bit state size.
In addition, the state-update function is linear during
the loading phase. From this, it follows that there are
222 weak key-IV pairs corresponding to each possible
weak loaded state. In fact, each pair comprises ex-
actly one of the 222 possible IVs and a corresponding
key.
To investigate the effects of weak loaded states, we
consider three scenarios: three LFSRs contain all-zero
values, two LFSRs contain all-zero values and one
LFSR contains all-zero values, as discussed later. For
each scenario, we identify the relationships between
key and IV bits that correspond to the weak key-IV
combinations.
4.1 Three LFSRs all Zeros
This section focuses on the scenario where all three
LFSRs contain all-zero values after completing the
loading phase. These three LFSRs will be clocked
and produce all zero output bits continuously until
the next rekeying. Thus the keystream bits obtained
by XORing these three outputs will also be zeros.
From Equation 3, the loaded contents of these
three LFSRs are expressed in the three terms
T 22A NA||MA, T 22B NB ||MB and T 22C NC ||MC . We
Table 1: Weak key-IV example: three all-zero LFSRs
key
00100000001000001001110011011101
10000001001101111001000000100011
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x0000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000
start with assuming these three terms (T 22A NA||MA,
T 22B NB ||MB , T 22C NC ||MC) are equal to all-zeros and
analyse the resulting system of equations using Gaus-
sian Elimination. This process generates the relation-
ship between key and IV bits that result in all three
LFSRs containing only zeros. We have 64 equations
with 86 variables, and hence 22 variables can be cho-
sen freely.
In particular, we may choose the IV bits (v0, v1 to
v21) freely and use these to determine the correspond-
ing 64-bit secret key that will result in all three regis-
ters containing all-zeros. The 22 free IV bits specify
the 64 key bits according to the system of equations
presented in Appendix A. By choosing all possible
values of the 22 free IV bits, we see that the total
number of weak key-IV pairs of this type is 222 and
the probability that a randomly chosen key-IV pair
satisfies these equations is 2−64.
As each of these pairs corresponds to a single IV
and an associated key, the probability that a ran-
domly chosen key belongs to a weak pair of this type is
222/264 = 2−42. Since each conversation is encrypted
with a single key, this is equivalent to stating that
the probability of a single (randomly chosen) conver-
sation being encrypted with one of these keys is also
2−42.
Now consider a conversation encrypted with a key
which belongs to one of these weak key-IV pairs. If
the conversation contains N frames, there is a further
probability of N/222 that the IV from this weak pair
has been used to encrypt one of these frames. There-
fore, there is an overall probability of N×2−64 that a
randomly chosen conversation contains a frame that
has been encrypted with a weak key-IV pair of this
sort.
Based on this analysis, Table 1 shows an example
of a weak key-IV pair that produces a fixed all-zero
keystream. The keystream is presented in hexadeci-
mal notation, to save space. As expected, the three
LFSRs A, B and C contain all-zero values after per-
forming the loading phase.
4.2 Two LFSRs all Zeros
This section focuses on the scenario in which two LF-
SRs contain all-zero values after performing the load-
ing phase. As the clocking stage in each of these two
LFSRs will contain a zero, the majority value will
be zero. Hence, these two LFSRs will be clocked ev-
ery time; however, the contents of these two LFSRs
will remain all-zeros. The third LFSR will be clocked
only until the content of its clocking stage has value
“1”. Since the diffusion phase consists of 100 clocking
steps before producing any keystream bits, this pro-
cess will ensure that the third LFSR will be in a fixed
state before the keystream generation begins.
The keystream bit z is obtained by XORing the
contents of the final stage of each LFSR: s18a , s
21
b and
s22c for LFSRs A, B and C respectively, since zt =
s18a,t⊕s21b,t⊕s22c,t. The final stage of the non-zero LFSR
will be fixed, and could contain either 0 or 1, while
the final stages of the other two LFSRs contain zeros.
The value in this stage of the fixed register is the
value of the key stream bit. Thus the keystream has
constant value for the entire frame.
Using the equations developed in Section 3, we can
relate the contents of the three LFSRs after the load-
ing phase to the key and IV bits that were loaded
into these LFSRs. From Equation 3, the behaviour
of these three LFSRs is expressed in the three terms
T 22A NA||MA, T 22B NB ||MB and T 22C NC ||MC . Our
analysis is conducted under the assumption that we
are looking for two LFSRs which have zero content in
each stage of these two LFSRs after performing the
loading phase, as shown in the three cases:
Case 1 LFSRs A and B have zero content
Case 2 LFSRs A and C have zero content
Case 3 LFSRs B and C have zero content
Note in passing that the scenario where all three
LFSRs contain all-zero values is the conjunction of
these three cases.
As before, we start with the terms (T 22A NA||MA,
T 22B NB ||MB), (T 22A NA ||MA, T 22C NC ||MC) and
(T 22B NB ||MB , T 22C NC ||MC). Setting each term equal
to all-zeros and applying Gaussian Elimination will
give us the conditions and relationships between key
and IV bits that apply to these weak key-IV pairs.
For the three cases, we have 41, 42, 45 equations re-
spectively with 86 variables, and hence 45, 44 and 41
variables can be chosen freely.
Conditions and probabilities of the weak key-IV
combinations depend on the number of available free
bits. Table 2 shows the number of key and IV free
bits that must be chosen to form a 64-bit secret key
that results in a weak key-IV pair of each type. All of
these weak key-IV pairs result in two all-zero LFSRs
and produce fixed keystream for the entire frame.
Table 2: Number of free bits for weak key-IV of each case for
two LFSRs all-zero
cases 1 2 3
key free bits 23 22 19
Involved IV bits 22 22 22
Case 1: We consider first the case where LFSRs
A and B both contain all-zeros. In this case, a 64-
bit secret key can be determined from 23 free key bits
(k41, k42, k43 to k63) and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v20, v21).
These 45 bits specify the remaining 41 key bits using
the system of equations in Appendix B. Therefore,
by choosing all possible values for the 23 key free bits
and the 22 IV bits, the total number of weak key-
IV pairs for Case 1 is 245 and the probability that a
randomly chosen key-IV pair satisfies this system of
equations is 2−41. It can be shown that each weak pair
for Case 1 involves a unique key, so the probability
that a randomly chosen key belongs to a weak pair of
Table 3: Two examples of weak key-IV (Case 1)
key 0110100101000010100110111011101001001011011111111111111111111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11111110110010110111001
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11111111011001011011100
Keystream 0x0000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000
key 1000001000101110111010101011001101100110111111111111111111111001
IV 1100000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11101101110111110100111
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 01110110111011111010011
Keystream 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
this sort is 2−19 and the probability that a randomly
chosen conversation ofN frames contains a frame that
has been encrypted with a Case 1 key-IV pair is 2−19×
N/222 = N × 2−41.
Based on this analysis, Table 3 shows two exam-
ples of Case 1 weak key-IV pairs that produce fixed
keystream (either zeros or ones). The keystream is
again presented in hex. Note that the bold and under-
lined bits are the clocking control bits and the output
bits respectively of the LFSRs A, B and C. The two
LFSRs A and B contain all zeros after performing the
loading phase due to the nonautonomous operation.
In each exmple, the keystream bits are just repeated
copies of the output bit of the LFSR C.
Case 2: We now consider the case where LFSRs
A and C both contain all-zeros. As in the previous
cases, it is possible to obtain a weak key-IV combi-
nation for A5/1 from this condition. For Case 2, a
64-bit secret key is formed from 22 key free bits (k42,
k43 to k63) and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v21). These
44 bits specify the remaining 42 key bits using the
system of equations in Appendix B. Therefore, by
choosing all possible values for the 22 key free bits
and the 22 IV bits, the total number of weak key-IV
for Case 2 is 244 and the probability that a randomly
chosen key-IV pair satisfies this system of equations
is 2−42. Each weak pair for Case 2 again involves a
unique key, so the probability that a randomly chosen
key belongs to a weak pair of this sort is 2−20 and the
probability that a randomly chosen conversation of N
frames contains a frame that has been encrypted with
a Case 2 key-IV pair is N × 2−42.
Based on this analysis, Table 4 shows two ex-
amples of weak key-IV pairs that produce fixed
keystream (either zeros or ones). As before, the
keystream is presented in hex, the bold bits are the
clocking taps and the underlined bits are the output
bits. The keystream bits in these examples have the
same value as the output bit of LFSR B.
Case 3: Consider finally the case where LFSRs B
and C both contain all-zeros. For this case, a 64-bit
Table 4: Two examples of weak key-IV (Case 2)
key 0101100010011111010111110101111001010101001111111111111110111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0101010101110110001000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0101010101110110001000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x0000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000
key 0111111010110100000001110001110110001110101111111111111110111001
IV 1100000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0001101100100110101011
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0001101100100110101011
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
secret key is formed from 19 key free bits (k45, k46
to k63) and 22 IV bits (v0, v1 to v21). These 41 bits
specify the remaining 45 key bits using the system
of equations in Appendix B. Therefore, by choosing
all possible values for the 19 key free bits and the 22
IV bits, the total number of weak key-IV for Case
3 is 241 and the probability that a randomly chosen
key-IV pair satisfies these equations is 2−45. As for
the other cases, each weak pair for Case 3 involves a
unique key, so the probability that a randomly chosen
key belongs to a weak pair of this sort is 2−23 and the
probability that a randomly chosen conversation of N
frames contains a frame that has been encrypted with
a Case 3 key-IV pair is N × 2−45.
Based on this analysis, Table 5 shows two ex-
amples of weak key-IV pairs that produce fixed
keystream (either zeros or ones). Once again, the
keystream is presented in hex, the bold bits are the
clocking taps and the underlined bits are the output
bits. In these examples, the keystream bits have the
same value as the output bit of the LFSR A.
Collating the results above, the number of weak
key-IV combinations for Cases 1, 2 and 3 are 245, 244
and 241 respectively. Moreover, apart from the sce-
nario with three all-zero registers, the resulting key-
IV pairs are distinct. Therefore, the total number
of weak key-IV combinations, when two LFSRs are
all-zero, is 245.64. Likewise, the probability that a
randomly chosen key-IV pair satisfies the equations
for any of these cases is found to be 2−40.36 and the
probability that a randomly chosen conversation of N
frames contains a frame that has been encrypted with
any of these key-IV pairs is N × 2−40.36.
4.3 One LFSR all Zeros
It is possible to find that exactly one LFSR contains
all-zero values after the loading phase. Whether this
LFSR is clocked or not during the keystream genera-
tion, the contribution to the keystream bit from this
LFSR is zero. In this situation at least one of the
other two LFSRs will be clocked. The value of the
Table 5: Two examples of weak key-IV (Case 3)
key 10111000110000001000000110001111
11010011111111111111110111111001
IV 1100000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0100000100010000001
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 1010000010001000000
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x0000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000
key 10100110101100110101101000000101
10000010010011111111110111111001
IV 1111000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 1011100001111110100
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 1100101110000111111
B 0000000000000000000000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
keystream bits actually depends only on the content
of the last bit of these other two LFSRs.
Once again, we use the equations developed in
Section 3 to relate the contents of the three LF-
SRs after the loading phase to the key and IV bits
that were loaded into these LFSRs. From Equa-
tion 3, the contents of the three LFSRs are ex-
pressed in the three terms T 22A NA||MA, T 22B NB ||MB
and T 22C NC ||MC . Our analysis is conducted under
the assumption that we are looking for a single LFSR
which has all-zeros in its stages after performing the
loading phase, as shown in the three cases:
Case 4 LFSR A contains all-zero values
Case 5 LFSR B contains all-zero values
Case 6 LFSR C contains all-zero values
The pairwise conjunctions of these cases are the
three cases from the scenario with two all-zero regis-
ters (Section 4.2), while the triple conjunction is the
scenario where all three LFSRs contain all-zero val-
ues.
Equation 3 is analysed using Gaussian Elimina-
tion (GE) to find the conditions mentioned above.
We start by setting the term (T 22A NA||MA) equal to
zero to find the relationship between key and IV bits.
This process is applied similarly for the other two
terms (T 22B NB ||MB) and (T 22C NC ||MC). This process
generates the relationship between key and IV bits
that result in an LFSR containing all-zero values af-
ter performing the loading phase. For the three cases
(4, 5 and 6), we have 19, 22, 23 equations respectively.
For each case, there are 86 variables, and hence 67, 64
and 63 variables can be chosen freely in the respective
cases.
The conditions and the probabilities of the weak
key-IVs depend on the number of free bits. Table 6
shows the number of key and IV free bits that must
be chosen to form a 64-bit secret key that results in a
weak key-IV that results in one LFSR having all-zero
values for the entire frame.
Table 6: Number of free bits for weak key-IV of each Case
for one LFSR all-zero
cases 4 5 6
key free bits 45 42 41
Involved IV bits 22 22 22
Table 7: Example of weak key-IV (Case 4)
key 1001111011001000001111111111111111111110011111111111111111111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 0100000111000111010100
C 11010011010111101110110
initial
state
A 0000000000000000000
B 1011101101100100100111
C 11011011011011100110011
Keystream 0x507802ACC6711F53C436082322478A
E8CB842631EA9CB9CC6869D6FCA
Case 4: For Case 4, a 64-bit secret key is formed
from 45 key free bits (k19, k20 to k63) and 22 IV bits
(v0, v1 to v21). These 67 bits specify the remaining
19 key bits using the relevant system of equations.
Therefore, by choosing all possible values for the 45
and 22 free key and IV bits respectively, the total
number of weak key-IV pairs for Case 4 is 267 and
the probability that a randomly chosen key-IV pair
satisfies these equations is 2−19. In this case, each of
the 264 possible keys belongs to exactly 8 Case 4 key-
IV pairs. For any given key, the IVs in these pairs are
distributed almost regularly through the IV space, so
the probability that a randomly chosen conversation
of N frames contains a frame that has been encrypted
with a Case 4 key-IV pair is N×2−19 for N ≤ 524043
and rises to 1 for N ≥ 524339. (Note: 219 = 524288.)
Based on this analysis, Table 7 shows an example
of a weak key-IV pair that results in LFSR A con-
taining all-zero values until the next rekeying. The
keystream is presented in hex and depends only on
LFSRs B and C. LFSR A contains all-zero values
after performing the loading phase due to the nonau-
tonomous feedback operation during that phase.
Case 5: For Case 5, a 64-bit secret key is formed
from 42 key free bits (k22, k23 to k63) and 22 IV bits
(v0, v1 to v21). These 64 key-IV bits specify the re-
maining 22 key bits using the relevant system of equa-
tions. Therefore, by choosing all possible values for
the 42 key free bits and the 22 IV free bits, the to-
tal number of weak key-IV for Case 5 is 264 and the
probability that a randomly chosen key-IV pair satis-
fies these equations is 2−22. Each of the 264 possible
keys belongs to exactly one Case 5 key-IV pair and
the probability that a randomly chosen conversation
of N frames contains a frame that has been encrypted
with a Case 5 key-IV pair is N × 2−22.
Based on this analysis, Table 8 shows an example
of a weak key-IV pair that produces a keystream from
only two effective LFSRs A and C. LFSR B contains
all-zero values after performing the loading phase due
to the nonautonomous operation.
Table 8: Example of weak key-IV (Case 5)
key 10000101100001100101111111101111
01111110011111111111111111111001
IV 1110100000000000000000
loaded
state
A 0001110101010110110
B 0000000000000000000000
C 01111000000000100101011
initial
state
A 0111101111111010110
B 0000000000000000000000
C 11011010101110111010111
Keystream 0x22832052674272A5FE39A39A530A86
1AD7672C4976B4B4EBE5A3C7413
Case 6: For Case 6, a 64-bit secret key is formed
from 41 key free bits (k23, k24 to k63) and 22 IV bits
(v0, v1 to v21). These 63 bits specify the remaining
23 key bits using the relevant system of equations.
Therefore, by choosing all possible values for the 41
key free bits and the 22 IV free bits, the total number
of weak key-IV pairs for Case 6 is 263 and the prob-
ability that a randomly chosen key-IV pair satisfies
these equations is 2−23. Each weak pair for Case 6
involves a unique key, so the probability that a ran-
domly chosen key belongs to a weak pair of this sort is
one-half and the probability that a randomly chosen
conversation of N frames contains a frame that has
been encrypted with a Case 6 key-IV pair is N×2−23.
Based on this analysis, Table 9 shows an example
of a weak key-IV pair that produces a keystream using
two effective LFSRs A and B. LFSR C contains all-
zero values after performing the loading phase until
the next rekeying due to the nonautonomous opera-
tion during the loading phase.
Table 9: Examples of weak key-IV (Case 6)
key 00111100001000111000001111111111
11111110011111111111111111111001
IV 1110000000000000000000
loaded
state
A 1001100111001111111
B 1011111011111010101110
C 00000000000000000000000
initial
state
A 0000101101110000000
B 1000011100111100110000
C 00000000000000000000000
Keystream 0x0F162408D5ACED21E25C9CD1B78E0E
0A687BCE90F2643E52E99013206
Collating the results for this scenario, the number
of weak key-IV pairs for Cases 4, 5 and 6 are 267, 264
and 263 respectively. Therefore, the total number of
weak key-IV pairs that result in one LFSR of A5/1
containing all-zeros is 267.25 and the probability that
a randomly chosen key-IV pair satisfies the equations
for any of these cases is 2−18.75. (The key-IV pairs
from Cases 1, 2 and 3 are included among these, but
form a negligible proportion (approximately 2−21.6) of
this total.) Each of the 264 possible keys belongs to
8 Case 4 key-IV pairs and one Case 5 pair, while half
of them belong to a Case 6 pair as well. Thus, every
conversation is encrypted with a key that belongs to
either 9 or 10 weak key-IV pairs from Cases 4, 5 or 6,
and (for N  219) the probability that a randomly
chosen conversation ofN frames contains a frame that
has been encrypted with a weak pair of this sort is
approximately 9.5×N × 2−22 = N × 2−18.75. (For N
approaching 219, this probability rises to 1 for N ≥
524339.)
Statistical analysis
In the scenarios where two or three registers contain
all-zero values, the keystream is constant and hence
immediately distinguishable, but this is not the case
for the scenario in which a single register contains
all-zero values. On the other hand, the latter sce-
nario potentially occurs in every conversation and its
probability of occurrence in a conversation of mod-
erate length is quite high, so it is worth investigat-
ing whether the key-stream from this scenario can
also be distinguished from the key-stream obtained
when none of the registers contains all-zero values.
The rest of the section therefore focuses on statistical
analyses which might distinguish a keystream from
A5/1 that is generated by two LFSRs only (while
the third LFSR contains all-zero values) from another
keystream generated by three LFSRs (in normal op-
eration).
Gustafson (Gustafson 1996) described statisti-
cal randomness tests of symmetric ciphers and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) (Rukhin et al. 2010) gives 15 tests of the ran-
domness of a given sequence of bits to measure the
degree of randomness of that given sequence of bits.
The most powerful tests are examined: Balance,
Runs tests and Linear complexity. Balance test is
also referred as Frequency (Monobit) test in some ref-
erences, and Uniformity test in others. Balance test
measure the proportion of zeros and ones for an en-
tire sequence. The number of zeros and ones for a
given sequence should meet the conditions of the ran-
domness test, with probabilities P (0) = P (1) = 12 .
The Runs test focuses on the total number of runs
in a sequence. A run is an uninterrupted sequence
of a particular character, either zeros or ones. Lin-
ear Complexity determines the smallest LFSR that
can generate the whole keystream over the finite field
Fn2 using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm (Menezes et al.
1996).
Keystream sequences are generated for different
scenarios of the targeted operation of the A5/1 cipher
as follows
• None of the LFSRs A, B or C contain all-zero
values (A, B and C all participate to form the
keystream bits)
• LFSR A contains all zeros (B and C participate
to form the keystream bits)
• LFSR B contains all zeros (A and C participate
to form the keystream bits)
• LFSR C contains all zeros (A and B participate
to form the keystream bits)
For each scenario, we performed an experiment in-
volving computer simulation. In each trial, we gener-
ated 105 random loaded states using C library seeded
random function to generate a 228-bit keystream seg-
ment (frame) from each loaded state. The Balance
and Runs test are applied for these generated frames.
Figure 2 demonstrates the Balance test for each sce-
nario. Table 10 shows the result of the Runs test.
Figures 3 and 4 show the result of linear complex-
ity of A5/1 for frame length 228 bits and 2000 bits
respectively.
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Figure 4: Linear Complexity for keystream sequences, for
n = 2000 bits
From the above tests, the distributions of the re-
spective patterns for all scenarios appear to be sim-
ilar. It seems that a keystream generated from two
non-zero LFSRs (while the third LFSR contains all-
zeros) can not be distinguished using Balance, Runs
or linear complexity tests. Since we have not deter-
mined a way to distinguish such a keystream, we will
not discuss further any method of attacking A5/1 in
this case.
5 Attack Procedure
Since A5/1 has a 64-bit key and a 64-bit internal
state, it is not feasible either to guess the inter-
nal state and generate keystream or to guess the
whole secret key and generate keystream for any given
IV. However, if it is possible to identify that the
keystream used to encrypt a specific frame arose from
one of a reduced set of intial states with a known for-
mat, this enables an attacker to reveal the secret key
Table 10: The average counts from the runs test for 4 sce-
narios based on 105 randomly simulated states
Runs A,B,C B,C A,C A,B
1 57.471 57.504 57.509 57.497
2 28.592 28.621 28.634 28.621
3 14.255 14.261 14.237 14.255
4 7.091 7.087 7.103 7.115
5 3.532 3.523 3.532 3.529
6 1.767 1.759 1.752 1.756
7 0.874 0.875 0.872 0.869
8 0.437 0.437 0.438 0.437
9 0.219 0.216 0.217 0.214
10 0.109 0.110 0.109 0.108
11 0.053 0.055 0.054 0.053
12 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.027
13 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013
14 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
15 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
16 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
17 0.0 0.001 0.001 0.001
18 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001
19 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
21 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
22 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
23 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
24 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
with reduced complexity. In our case, the keystream
generated when two or three LFSRs contain all-zeros
is immediately identifiable (since it either consists en-
tirely of zeros or entirely of ones), so the occurrence
of these scenarios is likewise distinguishable and an
attack can be mounted. Moreover, the redundancy
of speech enables us to recognise these frames in a
ciphertext-only context, which is the least restrictive
scenario for an attacker.
This section therefore presents a procedure for
identifying when a keystream sequence is either all
zeros or all ones and attacking the cipher by finding
the corresponding secret key. This procedure covers
all cases where two or three LFSRs contain only ze-
ros, so it is not necessary to determine beforehand
which two (or three) of the registers contain all-zeros.
Note that the procedure focuses on finding the secret
key, rather than on decrypting an individual frame
assuming the IV’s are known. Once the key is ob-
tained, all other frames in the conversation can then
be decrypted and the entire message recovered.
Attack Algorithm
The following algorithm is broken into two phases.
The first phase is not guaranteed to succeed; however,
if the first phase does succeed, the entire algorithm
will succeed and the entire message (conversation) wil
be recovered.
Phase 1 Given an encrypted conversation:
Step 1: Divide the encrypted speech (ciphertext)
into separate frames. Each ciphertext frame cor-
responds to one (known) IV.
Step 2: For each frame, check if either the frame or
its bitwise complement is intelligible. If so, pro-
ceed to Phase 2.
This phase identifies any frames encrypted with a
keystream sequence that is either all zeros or all ones.
(If any encrypted frame is intelligible and seems to
be plaintext, this indicates that the keystream is all
zeros, while if the complement of any encrypted frame
is intelligible and seems to be plaintext, this indicates
that the keystream is all ones.) If none of the frames
in the conversation satisfy this test, the attack fails
for this conversation.
Phase 2 Given a frame identified in Phase 1
Step 1: For each of Cases 1, 2 and 3 in turn:
• Guess the free key bits in the relevant set of
equations from Appendix B.
• Use these guessed free key bits and the
known IV to calculate the remaining key
bits using the relevant system of equations.
• Set the guessed and calculated key bits as
the current trial key.
• For any other frame in the conversation:
– Use the A5/1 algorithm to generate
keystream from the trial key and the
IV of that frame.
– Try to decrypt the encrypted frame us-
ing the generated keystream.
∗ If the encrypted frame is decrypted
successfully, then the secret key has
been identified.
∗ If not, repeat the process for an-
other guess.
Step 2: Once the secret key has been found, use this
secret key with the known IVs for each frame to
decrypt the entire intercepted ciphertext.
This phase checks all potential weak keys until the
correct one is found. Since the scenario with three all-
zero registers is a special case of the scenario with two
all-zero registers, it will also be covered by this search.
Discussion and Attack Complexity : As men-
tioned previously, the scenarios in which two or three
LFSRs contain all-zeros lead to a keystream which is
either all zeros or all ones. The corresponding frames
of conversation are easily distinguishable, so we refer
to these as weak frames. When such a frame is ob-
served, the whole conversation can be decrypted after
guessing and checking up to 223.64 possible keys to
obtain the actual secret key. As discussed in Section
4.2, the probability that a randomly chosen conver-
sation of N frames contains a weak frame of this sort
is N × 2−40.36.
Table 11 list some typical values of N for various
lengths of conversation, together with the correspond-
ing probability that a weak frame will be observed in
a conversation of that length. If we take 5 minutes as
a common length of conversation, we see that roughly
one in 224.36 ≈ 21.5×106 conversations of this length
can be completely decrypted using this attack.
We have also examined the scenario in which only
one register contains all-zero values. The keystream
generated under this scenario is not immediately dis-
tinguishable, so we applied some common statistical
randomness tests to see whether these would enable
this scenario to be distinguished. Although we have
been unable to find a test that does so, this scenario
Table 11: Number of frames for various lengths of conversa-
tion
No of Conversation Probability of
frames time weak frame
214 1min 16sec 2−26.36
216 5min 2sec 2−24.36
218 20min 6sec 2−22.36
220 1h 21min 2−20.36
222 5h 22min 2−18.36
is of great interest as it potentially occurs in every
conversation and its probability of occurrence in a
conversation of moderate length is quite high, rising
to 1 for N just over 219 (equivalent to 40 minutes
of conversation). Moreover, although the approxima-
tion of N × 2−18.75 for this probability does not hold
exactly as N approaches 219, it is clear that the prob-
ability becomes alarmingly high (greater than 1 in 7)
for conversations as short as 5 minutes in duration.
On the other hand, an attack based on this scenario
would require guessing and checking of up to 245.25
possible keys in order to find the correct one for that
particular conversation.
6 Conclusion
The non-autonomous feedback mechanism which ap-
plies during the loading phase of A5/1 may result in
weak key-IV pairs, where one or more of the LFSRs
contain all zero values at the end of the loading phase.
If this condition occurs, it is then maintained during
the diffusion and keystream generation phases, poten-
tially leading to a weak keystream.
This paper has considered three scenarios related
to weak key-IV pairs in A5/1: all three LFSRs
may contain all-zero values, exactly two LFSRs may
contain all-zero values or a single LFSR may con-
tain all-zero values. For a conversation containing
N frames, the probabilities that the conversation
includes a frame satisfying these respective scenar-
ios are N × 2−64, N × 2−40.36 and approximately
N × 2−18.75.
When either of the first two scenarios occurs, the
corresponding frame is immediately distinguishable,
as it contains either plaintext only or complemented
plaintext only. Once such a frame has been identified,
the secret key can easily be obtained and the entire
conversation can then be decrypted.
We have presented a ciphertext-only attack which
exploits this weakness; the probability of a successful
attack on a five minute conversation is approximately
one in 20 million and the complexity of a successful
attack is approximately 223.64. (Due to the distin-
guishing nature of this attack, no calculations are re-
quired in cases where the targeted scenario does not
occur. In particular, no pre-computation is required.)
The third scenario (when a single LFSR con-
tains all-zeros) could potentially lead to a similar at-
tack, provided the resulting keystream can be dis-
tinguished. However, finding a distinguisher for this
keystream remains an open problem for the moment.
If such a distinguisher could be found, conversations
as short as 5 minutes in duration would be at high risk
of attack, although the associated complexity would
be higher.
It should be noted that in the current specification
of A5/1, there is no pre-testing of the key-IV pair to
identify whether the pair is weak or not, nor is the
loaded state checked to determine whether it satis-
fies any of the above scenarios, but the keystream is
used in any case. The weak loaded states arise due to
the non-autonomous feedback used during the loading
phase, so a completely different loading mechanism
would be required if the occurrence of such states is
to be avoided. Alternatively, the loaded state could
be checked each time the algorithm is re-initialised
and a suitable adjustment could be applied if it was
found to be a weak state.
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A Three LFSRs contain all-zeros values
The conditions for the system of equations that result
in all three LFSRs containing all-zero values can be
described as follows:
k0 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v18
k1 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v19
k2 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v20
k3 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v21
k4 =v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15
k5 =v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16
k6 =v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17
k7 =v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18
k8 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18⊕
v19
k9 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19⊕
v20
k10 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20⊕
v21
k11 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k12 =v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k13 =v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k14 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19⊕
v20
k15 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20⊕
v21
k16 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k17 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k18 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k19 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k20 =v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k21 =v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k22 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k23 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k24 =v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k25 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k26 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k27 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k28 =v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k29 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v19 ⊕ v20
k30 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k31 =v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k32 =v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
k33 =v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k34 =v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k35 =v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k36 =v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k37 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k38 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k39 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k40 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k41 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k42 =v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k43 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k44 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k45 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v17 ⊕ v21
k46 =v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
k47 =v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
k48 =v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k49 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v17
k50 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v18
k51 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v19
k52 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v20
k53 =v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v21
k54 =v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k55 =v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k56 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k57 =v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k58 =v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k59 =v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k60 =v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k61 =v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17⊕
v20
k62 =v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
k63 =v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v17
B Two LFSRs contain all-zeros values
For two LFSRs contain all-zeros, there are 3 possible
cases of LFSRs that contain all-zeros, as mentioned
previously, Case 1, 2 and 3 for LFSRs (A,B), (A,C)
or (B,C) respectively. The relationship between key
and IV bits that result in two LFSRs containing all-
zeros values can be expressed as follows:
Case 1:
To obtain two LFSRs A and B containing all-zero val-
ues at the end of loading phase, the following system
of equations must be satisfied:
k0 =k41 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56⊕
k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k1 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57⊕
k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k2 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58⊕
k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k3 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59⊕
k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k4 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60⊕
k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k5 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61⊕
k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k6 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k7 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k8 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0⊕
v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k9 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1⊕
v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k10 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2⊕
v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k11 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k13 =k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
k14 =k41 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55⊕
k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k15 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56⊕
k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k16 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57⊕
k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k17 =k41 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58⊕
k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v18
k18 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60⊕
v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k19 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49⊕
k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58⊕
k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k20 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50⊕
k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59⊕
k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k21 =k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61⊕
k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
k22 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57⊕
k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k23 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58⊕
k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k24 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59⊕
k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k25 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60⊕
k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k26 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61⊕
v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k27 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62⊕
v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k28 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63⊕
v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20⊕
v21
k29 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0⊕
v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k30 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1⊕
v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k31 =k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2⊕
v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k32 =k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3⊕
v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k33 =k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k34 =k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k35 =k41 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56⊕
k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k36 =k41 ⊕ k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59⊕
k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k37 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k38 =k41 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54⊕
k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k39 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55⊕
k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k40 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56⊕
k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
Case 2:
The conditions for the system of equations that are
required to result in LFSRs A and C containing all-
zero values after completing loading phase can be ex-
pressed as follows:
k0 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60⊕
k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k1 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k61⊕
k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k2 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k3 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k4 =k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1⊕
v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k5 =k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v1⊕
v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k6 =k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v2⊕
v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k7 =k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k8 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55⊕
k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k9 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56⊕
k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k10 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57⊕
k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k11 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58⊕
k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k12 =k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59⊕
k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k13 =k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v20
k14 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57⊕
k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v17
k15 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58⊕
k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14⊕
v18
k16 =k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59⊕
k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15⊕
v19
k17 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62⊕
v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k18 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k58⊕
k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16⊕
v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k19 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53⊕
k54 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v21
k20 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54⊕
k55 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k21 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k22 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k23 =k42 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62⊕
v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
k24 =k43 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63⊕
v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k25 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59⊕
k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k26 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56⊕
k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
k27 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57⊕
k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16⊕
v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k28 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58⊕
k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17⊕
v20 ⊕ v21
k29 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59⊕
k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k30 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k31 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61⊕
k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k32 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k33 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k34 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0⊕
v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k35 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k36 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53⊕
k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k37 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53⊕
k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k38 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57⊕
k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k39 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58⊕
k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19
k40 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59⊕
k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
k41 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60⊕
k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
Case 3:
The system of equations that is required to result in
LFSRs B and C containing all-zero values can be ex-
pressed as follows:
k0 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k1 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k2 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v15⊕
v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k3 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v16⊕
v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k4 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v17⊕
v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k5 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v18⊕
v19 ⊕ v21
k6 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v19⊕
v20
k7 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k8 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61⊕
k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k9 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62⊕
k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k10 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63⊕
v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k11 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0⊕
v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1⊕
v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k13 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2⊕
v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k14 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3⊕
v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v20
k15 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4⊕
v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v21
k16 =k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v15
k17 =k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v16
k18 =k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v17
k19 =k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v18
k20 =k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v19
k21 =k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v20
k22 =k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v21
k23 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k24 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k25 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k26 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k27 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v21
k28 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17
k29 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v17
k30 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63⊕
v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
k31 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0⊕
v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k32 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5⊕
v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k33 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6⊕
v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k34 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7⊕
v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k35 =k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8⊕
v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k36 =k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9⊕
v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k37 =k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10⊕
v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k38 =k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11⊕
v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k39 =k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20
k40 =k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k41 =k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20
k42 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11⊕
v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v21
k43 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12⊕
v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
k44 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13⊕
v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
